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3.1  Introduction 
The volatility of  the world economy since the breakdown of  the 
Bretton Woods par value system of exchange rates has led many pol- 
icymakers and economists to call for reform of the international mon- 
etary system. Many economists have argued that domestic macroeco- 
nomic policies in the major OECD economies should be geared, at least 
in part, to maintaining exchange rates within ranges set cooperatively 
among the major countries.  Proposals vary from the  “target  zone” 
system, as advocated by Williamson (1983) and Roosa (1984), to a much 
more  stringent  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  as  advocated  by 
McKinnon (1984). There are several possible arguments in the case for 
a return to a more managed system, as described in recent surveys by 
Obstfeld (1985) and Sachs (1985b). One crucial argument has been that 
the equilibrium of noncooperative macroeconomic policymaking under 
flexible exchange rates is likely to be inefficient, as countries fail to 
take into account the external effects of their policies on their trading 
partners.  More rigid  rules of  the game, as embodied  in  a managed 
exchange rate system, are seen as a way to reduce the inducements to 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies.  It has been frequently noted that there 
are many institutional forms that greater cooperation might take, rang- 
ing from the give-and-take of bargaining at economic summit meetings 
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to the implicit form of cooperation that takes place when each country 
adheres to externally  imposed exchange rate targets.  The exchange 
rate alternative is seen as particularly attractive in that it reduces the 
needs for constant, face-to-face bargaining. The hope is that, by chang- 
ing rules of  the game, policymakers can then be free to act indepen- 
dently (i.e., noncooperatively) within the confines of the international 
agreement. Tighter margins for exchange rate fluctuations might elim- 
inate the most noxious forms of international competition, in the same 
way that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has significantly 
reduced the international competition via tariff setting. 
There are of  course limits to the gains that will be achieved by a 
change in the international rules of  the game. Every set of exchange 
arrangements will generate its own forms of strategic behavior, which 
will  tend to cause  some forms of  inefficient strategic behavior.  For 
example, while much of recent writing in this area has considered the 
gaming aspects of  flexible exchange rates (see Canzoneri and Gray 
1985, and Buiter and Marston 1985), many other studies have shown 
that similar strategic issues arise in fixed exchange rate systems. In- 
deed, the original analytical  work  in this area, by  Hamada  (1974), 
considered the case of monetary management under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Even the classical gold standard, the self-regulating system 
par excellence, offered up incentives for inefficient strategic behavior, 
as argued by Eichengreen (1985) and Matsuyama (1985). An important 
task of research in this area is to make quantitative judgments about 
the  gains  and  losses  from  alternative  forms  of  exchange  rate 
management. 
This paper  studies the properties of four alternative international 
monetary regimes, with respect both to their operating characteristics 
and to the incentives for strategic behavior  under each regime.  We 
consider alternatively a floating exchange rate system and three forms 
of fixed exchange rate systems. In the floating rate system, we assume 
that  policymakers  in each country  can choose monetary  and  fiscal 
instruments in order to maximize a national social welfare function, 
without having to gear the policy choices to a particular exchange rate 
target. In the fixed exchange rate systems, some or all of the countries 
are required to peg the exchange rate as a side condition on their policy 
actions.  We  then  study  the  implications  of  the exchange rate  con- 
straints. However, we do not ask the more fundamental question whether 
the exchange rate system itself would be viable or whether the countries 
would instead choose to bow out of the arrangement. 
As  is well known, a fixed exchange rate system must be specified 
by much more than the constraint that bilateral or multilateral rates be 
fixed. It is crucial to specify which countries have the obligation to 
intervene in order to preserve a given peg. The so-called N -  1 problem 75  Coordination  of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
underlines the fact that in a fixed regime of N countries, only N -  1 
countries need to undertake the obligation to stabilize. The Nth coun- 
try, presumably, can act without direct regard for the consequences of 
its policies on the exchange rate. The “problem,”  generally speaking, 
is to decide how the responsibilities for pegging are allocated among 
the countries. 
We  consider three alternatives that are widely discussed. The first 
is an asymmetric “dollar standard,” in which the United States assumes 
no responsibility in pegging the exchange rate, while the other countries 
(specifically Japan, and the rest of the OECD, which we call the ROECD) 
both peg to the dollar. This system, making the United States the Nth 
country, is considered by many to be a reasonable description of how 
the Bretton Woods system actually operated (see Swoboda 1978). In 
fact, it should be remembered that under the Bretton Woods arrange- 
ment, the United States had the side condition to peg the dollar price 
of gold at $35 per ounce, though it is difficult to find an important effect 
of this constraint on U.S. policy actions through most of the Bretton 
Woods period. 
The other two systems that we study are symmetric solutions to the 
N- 1 problem,  B la gold  standard. Recently,  McKinnon (1984)  has 
proposed a fixed exchange rate arrangement for the United  States, 
Germany, and Japan, in which the cross rates among these countries 
are fixed, and in which the weighted sum of the money stocks of  the 
three countries is to be held constant. This means that any expansion 
of money in  one country must  be matched by a compensating con- 
traction in the other countries. Note that a strict gold standard, with a 
constant world stock of gold reserves, would work this way: any in- 
crease in money in one country (backed 100% by gold reserves) would 
necessarily  require  a contraction in money in the rest of the world. 
Subject to this monetary constraint, the countries would be free to 
pursue independent fiscal policies. 
This monetary standard is extremely strict in making the aggregate 
stock of world money invariant to underlying conditions. As a third 
fixed  exchange  rate  arrangement,  we  experiment  with  a  modified 
McKinnon plan (dubbed McKinnon 11), in which the exchange rates 
across regions are fixed, but in which the weighted world money stock 
is controlled cooperatively by the participating countries to forestall 
large swings in world economic activity. Using a numerical model later, 
we attempt to find an equilibrium set of rules for fiscal policy in each 
country and for the global money stock, which has the following prop- 
erties: the fiscal rules are optimal for each country, taking as given the 
fiscal rules in the other countries and the rule for the management of 
the global money stock, while at the same time the cooperative money 
rule is optimal, taking as given the fiscal rules in each of the countries. 76  Wanvick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
Within each of these exchange rate systems, we analyze the behavior 
and characteristics of fiscal policy and examine the way changes in the 
rules of the game affect the incentives to use fiscal and monetary pol- 
icies. In particular,  we seek to determine whether the various ineffi- 
ciencies of floating rates caused by the strategic behavior of individual 
countries can be muted by a move to a more managed system. Under 
various circumstances, a move to managed rates can indeed blunt the 
inefficient deployment of fiscal policies, but we also find that there are 
many  circumstances in  which  the introduction of  fixed  rates would 
itself lead to serious inefficiencies of other sorts. As is common in this 
kind of research, the desirability of one type of monetary arrangement 
over another will depend to an important extent on the nature of the 
underlying shocks hitting the world economy. 
In section 3.2 we examine the transmission of fiscal policies under 
alternative  exchange rate arrangements, using an extremely simple ver- 
sion of the Mundell-Fleming model for heuristic  purposes. We  then 
move on to a large-scale empirical model of the world  economy in 
section 3.3, in which the same fiscal experiments are performed.  We 
find that the cross-country transmission of fiscal policy is affected in 
crucial quantitative ways according to the global monetary arrange- 
ments in which the fiscal expansion takes place. In section 3.4 we take 
up the strategic aspects of monetary and fiscal policies under the al- 
ternative monetary arrangements that we are examining, and present 
illustrations  in  which a return to fixed  rates would  indeed  raise the 
efficiency of  macroeconomic management. In  section 3.5 the large- 
scale empirical model is then used to study strategic aspects of poli- 
cymaking in a differential game format. We  examine a game of disin- 
flation, in which  all of the major economies begin the game with an 
excessively high inflation rate and in which all then use monetary and 
fiscal policies (subject to the rules of the exchange regime) in order to 
disinflate  optimally.  Once again  we confirm the crucial  quantitative 
importance of  alternative exchange regimes for policy  choices and 
macroeconomic outcomes. Finally, in section 3.6 we introduce a useful 
methodology for judging the long-run efficiency of alternative forms of 
monetary arrangements. Some concluding remarks are offered in sec- 
tion 3.7. 
3.2  Fiscal Policy Transmission in a Simple Mundell-Fleming Model 
We  now introduce a simple, static, two-country  model in order to 
illustrate the implications for fiscal policy of alternative monetary re- 
gimes. We  introduce the barest-bones model here for illustrative pur- 
poses only, since in section 3.3 we study a richly specified and empir- 
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that  even the  simplest fixed-price model can give us a good under- 
standing of  the properties  of the short-run policy  multipliers in  the 
large-scale model. 
Consider the following standard setup, as in Mundell (1968). We 
assume that domestic and foreign goods prices (p and p*)  are fixed, 
and that there is perfect capital mobility  (i = i*).  The exchange rate 
(e)  between the two countries is in units of the home currency per unit 
of foreign currency. An asterisk ($1  denotes foreign country. The model 
is specified with two money demand equations, and two IS curves. The 
notation is standard: m is (log) money balances; p is (log) prices; q is 
(log) output; i is the nominal interest rate; and g is the measure of fiscal 
policy. The equations are as follows: 
(1)  m -  p  = +q -  pi 
(2) 
(3)  q =  -S(p  -  e -  p') - ui + Xg  + yq* 
(4)  q* = 6(p - e -  p') - ai  + Xg* + yq 
We assume, as is standard, that the interaction term in the IS equations, 
y,  is positive and less than one in value. We  consider four monetary 
regimes and study the fiscal policy multipliers in each case. The regimes 
are: 
(a) floating exchange rate  (the change in  the exchange rate,  de, is 
unrestricted, and pure fiscal policy is studied with dm = dm* = 0); 
(b) dollar standard (U.S. monetary policy is held fixed, so that dm = 0 
and the foreign money supply adjusts endogenously so that de = 0); 
(c) McKinnon rule (the exchange rate is fixed, de = 0, and a weighted 
averageofthemoney stocksmw = a  m + (1 -  a)  m'is held fixed); 
(d) modified McKinnon rule (de = 0, mw is allowed to change). 
We  now turn to the fiscal policy multipliers. 
(a)  Floating exchange rate 
fiscal and monetary policy are: 
m'  -  p* = +q* -  pj 
The system (1)-(4)  is differentiated and solved. The multipliers for 78  Warwick .I.  McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
-  (dm' -  dm)  de = -(dg*  - dg) - -  A 
26  26+ 
In this symmetric case fiscal policy is positively  transmitted across 
countries (given that y < 1) with the country having the largest fiscal 
expansion experiencing an appreciation of its currency. Monetary pol- 
icy is negatively transmitted, since a money supply expansion at home 
causes the exchange rate to depreciate, and thereby shifts demand from 
the foreign country to the home market. 
(b)  Dollar standard 
de = 0, dm exogenous and dm'  endogenous. In this case we find: 
The system is  again solved, this time using the assumptions that 
A  41  + r)/P dm 
A 
dq = -  (dg + y dg*) + 
A 
where 
A foreign fiscal expansion is again transmitted positively to the home 
country, while a domestic fiscal expansion will actually be negatively 
transmitted if u+ > Py.  This surprising result occurs because the fiscal 
expansion by the home country tends to appreciate the currency. The 
foreign country is thereby required to undertake a monetary contrac- 
tion in order to prevent its currency from depreciating. The contrac- 
tionary effects of this endogenous monetary response can be sufficient 
to offset the normal expansionary effect coming through a rise in ex- 
ports to the home country. Note that a rise in home-country  money, 
dm > 0, raises output in both countries and induces a corresponding 
increase in the foreign money supply. 
There is  admittedly  something artificial in  the way we  study this 
case, in that g and g'  are assumed to be exogenous, so that m* is the 
"automatic"  instrument that the foreign country uses to peg the ex- 
change rate.  If, for example, we  were instead to assume that g" is 
altered to keep de = 0, then a home fiscal expansion (dg > 0) would 
necessarily  raise foreign output. In the later empirical sections,  the 
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order to maximize a social welfare function, subject to the constraint 
that de = 0. 
(c)  McKinnon rule 
In the fixed exchange rate regime proposed by McKinnon (1984), 
the exchange rate between the major countries would be fixed, together 
with an exogenously set growth rate of a weighted average world money 
stock. The implications of this regime for fiscal policy in this simple 
model can be found by setting dmw = adm + (1 -  a)dm'  as an exog- 
enous variable, and requiring that de = dmw = 0. Monetary policy in 
both countries is endogenous. Doing this we find: 
where 
In this case both home and foreign fiscal policies will be negatively 
transmitted if u+(1 -  a)  > rP  for a foreign expansion and a+a > rP 
for a domestic expansion. 
The form of the monetary regime has been shown to have important 
implications for the transmission of fiscal policy in the world economy. 
Later, we will see that the nature of the transmission will have important 
consequences for policy coordination among the major economies. In 
the next section we use a large-scale simulation model in an attempt 
to better quantify the fiscal policy multipliers. 
3.3  Fiscal policy in an Empirical Model 
In this section we use the MSG (McKibbin-Sachs Global) simulation 
model to examine the international transmission of fiscal policy. The 
MSG model was developed in Sachs and McKibbin (1985). The reader 
is also referred to recent papers by Ishii, McKibbin, and Sachs (1985), 
McKibbin and Sachs (1985) and Sachs (1985a) for several applications 
and refinements. The model is a rational-expections, dynamic general 
equilibrium macroeconomic model of the world economy. A full list of 
equations is provided in the Appendix. The world economy is divided 
into five regions consisting of the United States, Japan, the ROECD, 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the 80  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
non-oil developing countries. Each region is linked via flows of goods 
and  assets.  Stock-flow relationships  and  intertemporal  budget  con- 
straints are carefully observed. Budget deficits cumulate into a stock 
of  government debt which must eventually be financed, while current 
account deficits cumulate into a stock of  foreign debt. Asset markets 
are forward-looking, so that the exchange rate and long-term interest 
rate are conditioned by the entire future path of policy. 
There are equations for the internal macroeconomic structure of the 
three  industrialized  regions  of  the  United  States, the ROECD, and 
Japan, while the OPEC and developing-country regions have only their 
foreign trade and financial structures incorporated. Each region pro- 
duces a good that is an imperfect substitute in the consumption baskets 
of  each  of  the  other regions.  Consumption of  each good  therefore 
depends on income and relative prices. Private absorption depends on 
financial wealth, disposable income, and long-term and short-term real 
interest rates along conventional lines. Nominal wages are predeter- 
mined in each period, with the nominal wage change between periods 
a function of lagged consumer price inflation, the output gap, and the 
change in the output gap. With the assumption that the gross domestic 
product  (GDP) deflator is  a fixed markup over wages,  we  derive a 
standard Phillips curve equation. In essence, the model is a generalized 
version of the Dornbusch (1976) model, in which the goods markets 
clear less rapidly than the asset markets. 
Residents in  different countries hold their own country’s assets as 
well as foreign assets (except foreign money), based on the relative 
expected rates of  return, with  expectations being formed rationally. 
While we  specify the asset demand functions in  a general portfolio 
balance fashion, the parameter values that we impose make the model 
behave almost as if  assets were perfect substitutes. Money demand is 
specified according to a standard transactions-demand formulation. 
The model is parameterized using actual 1983 trade shares and asset 
stocks. Behavioral parameters are chosen to be consistent with values 
found in the empirical literature. We have shown elsewhere (see Sachs 
1985a) that the model is able to explain much of  the macroeconomic 
experience of  the 1980s, including the strong dollar and trade imbal- 
ances by shifts in macroeconomic policies in the United States, Japan, 
and the ROECD. 
We  simulate nonlinear and linear versions of  the model using nu- 
merical techniques which take into account the fonvard-looking vari- 
ables in the model. Specifically we use a procedure described by Fair 
and Taylor (1983). The linearized version of the model is amenable to 
policy-optimization exercises and has previously been used to consider 
the gains to policy coordination using dynamic game theory techniques 
(see Sachs and McKibbin  1985). Throughout the paper  we  use  the 
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programming in later sections. We  have verified in earlier work that 
there is little difference between the policy multipliers in the linearized 
and nonlinear versions of the model in the exercises studied here. 
We  simulate a fiscal expansion by assuming a permanent  1%  of GNP 
increase  in  real  government  expenditure  on  domestic  goods,  com- 
mencing in  1984, which is financed by government debt. We  assume 
that the expenditure increase is permanent, and expected on impact to 
be permanent, with the budget deficit remaining 1% of GNP above the 
baseline path. Because of rising interest payments on the accumulating 
public debt, the deficit would tend to grow over time in the absence 
of compensating cuts in expenditure or increases in taxes. We  assume 
that over time the increase in  interest repayments is paid for through 
higher tax revenues. Note that the economies all possess a steady state 
growth rate of  3% per annum. In steady-state equilibrium, a constant 
deficit is compatible with a fixed debt-GDP ratio as long as the increase 
in debt due to the deficit causes the total debt stock to grow at the 3% 
annual rate. This requirement means that the steady-state debt-GDP 
ratio equals the steady-state deficit-GDP ratio divided by  0.03. For 
example, a permanent increase in the budget deficit, which raises the 
deficit from zero to 1% of GDP, causes the steady-state debt-GDP ratio 
to rise from zero to 33% of GDP. 
Table 3.1 contains the results for a fiscal expansion in the United 
States under a pure floating exchange rate. Real GNP, the exchange 
rate, and money supply are recorded as a percentage deviation from 
the initial baseline, while the trade deficit and budget deficit are both 
reported as deviations from the baseline in percent of potential GNP. 
Inflation and the nominal interest rate are shown as percentage point 
deviations from the baseline (indicate with D). The absence of Ricardian 
consumers and the presence of price stickiness is obvious in the results. 
The real output multiplier follows a familiar hump shape: output rises 
initially, but over time rising interest rates, rising prices, a strong dollar, 
and rising taxes to finance the growing debt burden crowd out the fiscal 
stimulus. Crowding out is complete by  1989. Note that the dollar ap- 
preciates  on impact  by  3.3% against  the  Ecu  (the currency  of  the 
ROECD) and the yen. Interest rates rise throughout the world, although 
by more in the United States than abroad. The differential in large part 
captures the expectation of  a future depreciation of the U.S. dollar 
(remember, though, that because of the portfolio balance assumptions, 
there is also a slight and growing risk premium on dollar-denominated 
assets). The fiscal impulse is positively transmitted to the rest of  the 
world as Japanese and ROECD trade balances improve, thanks both 
to the demand stimulus from higher U.S.  output and to the strong dollar. 
The positive transmission quickly fades as rising world interest rates 
have their effect. Note that inflation initially falls in the United States. 
This result follows from our somewhat artificial assumption that home 82  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.1  U.S. Fiscal Expansion under a Flexible Exchange Rate 
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goods prices do not respond at all within the first year to higher domestic 
output, while import prices fall in response to the appreciation of the 
dollar. 
Table 3.2 contains corresponding results for an ROECD fiscal ex- 
pansion under a flexible exchange rate. The results are similar to those 
for the U.S. fiscal stimulus, with a positive transmission of output to 
the United States and Japan. The ROECD exchange rate appreciates 
against the dollar by 3.4% on impact, and against the yen by 3.1% on 
impact. 
The results for a U.S.  fiscal expansion under a dollar standard regime 
are shown next in table 3.3. In specifying this regime, we make several 
crucial assumptions. First, the comparative dynamic exercises assume 
that the non-U.S. economies peg their exchange rates to the dollar via 
monetary rather than fiscal policy. In other words, the U.S.  fiscal mul- 
tipliers assume that foreign fiscal policies are held fixed, while foreign 
monetary policies are wholly endogenous. Second, the form of mon- 
etary intervention must be made clear. The authorities could choose 
to stabilize the exchange rate with intervention on the foreign exchange 
markets or via intervention in the domestic credit markets (e.g., open- 
market operations, rediscounting, etc.). In a world of  perfect capital 83  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Table 3.2  ROECD Fiscal Expansion under a Flexible Exchange Rate 
1984  1985  1986  1987 
U.S. economy 
Real GNP  %  0.7  0.2  0.1  -0.2 
Inflation  D  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Nominal interest rate  D  0.6  1.2  1.4  1.6 
Trade balance  %GNP  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Budget deficit  %GNP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Exchange rate (Ecu/$)  %  -3.4  -3.1  -3.1  -2.9 
Money supply  %  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Japanese economy 
Real GNP  %  0.5  0.1  0.1  -0.1 
Inflation  D  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.3 
Nominal interest rate  D  0.4  1.0  1.2  1.4 
Trade balance  %GNP  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2 
Budget deficit  %GNP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Exchange rate (yen/$)  %  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.6 
Money supply  %  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
ROECD economies 
Real GNP  %  1.1  1.1  0.7  0.4 
Nominal interest rate  D  0.9  1.4  2.0  2.4 
Budget deficit  %GNP  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Inflation  D  -0.2  0.3  0.5  0.6 
Trade balance  %GNP  -0.4  -0.3  -0.3  -0.3 
Money supply  %  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1988  1989 
-0.3  -0.5 
0.3  0.2 
1.7  1.7 
-2.6  -2.3 
0.3  0.3 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
-0.2  -0.4 
0.2  0.1 
1.4  1.4 
-0.7  -0.8 
0.2  0.1 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
0.0  -0.4 
0.5  0.5 
2.6  2.8 
-0.3  -0.3 
1.0  1.0 
0.0  0.0 
mobility, all of these alternatives would be identical from the point of 
view of macroeconomic outcomes, while in a world of imperfect capital 
mobility, differences will arise depending on the nature of exchange 
rate pegging.  Since our model assumes very high,  though not fully 
perfect, substitutability, the choice of intervention mechanism is quan- 
titatively of  some, but only minor, importance.  In fact, in all of our 
specifications used in the paper, we assume that the exchange rate is 
stabilized through interventions in the domestic money market. 
Several results are striking. The first is the negative transmission of 
the U.S. fiscal expansion to the rest of the world. In this case both 
Japan and the ROECD adopt severely contractionary monetary policies 
in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate. The result is severe reces- 
sion in both regions.  The recessionary  effect  of  the contractionary 
monetary policies quickly feeds back to the United States, and does 
much to dampen the U.S. fiscal multiplier (it turns negative by 1987). 
The asymmetry in the dollar standard regime is illustrated in table 3.4, 
which shows the results for an ROECD fiscal expansion. In contrast 
to the U.S. fiscal expansion, the ROECD fiscal expansion is positively 
transmitted to the rest of the world. The Ecu tends to appreciate, so 
that the ROECD monetary authorities are compelled to expand the 84  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.3  U.S. Fiscal Expansion under a Dollar Standard 
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domestic money supply. This leads to an enormous expansion in  the 
ROECD and positive transmission to the other economies. 
Table 3.5 illustrates the consequence of a fiscal expansion under the 
McKinnon rule. In this case we study the effects of  a fiscal expansion 
under the assumption that a geometric weighted average of  the money 
supplies in the United States, the ROECD, and Japan is fixed, and that 
the exchange rates are similarly fixed. The weights used (somewhat 
arbitrarily) are the GNP weights for 1983. In this case, as with the U.S. 
expansion under the dollar standard, the transmission of  fiscal policy 
is  negative.  Once again,  the  non-U.S.  economies are compelled  to 
contract their money stocks while the United States expands its money 
stock. The result is a rise in interest rates abroad that is sufficient to 
overwhelm the direct effects of  the U.S.  stimulus. The extent of  the 
recession  abroad  is  less  than  in  the  dollar  standard,  since, in  the 
McKinnon case, the United States is compelled to expand its money 
supply in line with the fiscal expansion. 
The effects of an ROECD fiscal expansion under the McKinnon rule 
are shown in table 3.6. Now the ROECD fiscal expansion is negatively 
transmitted to the rest of the world. Clearly, the McKinnon rule on 
world money  supplies imposes more symmetry than does the dollar 85  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Table 3.4  ROECD Fiscal Expansion under a Dollar Standard 
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0.5  0.1  -0.5 
0.7  0.9  0.8 
2.2  3.0  3.4 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.7  0.7  0.6 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.6  0.1  -0.5 
1.0  1.1  0.9 
2.0  2.7  3.0 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.5  0.5  0.3 
0.0  0.0  0.0 
1.2  1.4  1.6 
1.1  -1.6  -4.3 
2.8  2.4  1.5 
2.8  3.8  4.4 
0.6  -0.6  -0.6 
1.0  1.0  1.0 
7.5  7.8  7.0 
rule. In the case of an ROECD fiscal expansion under the McKinnon 
rule, the United States and Japan contract monetary policy and the 
ROECD expands monetary policy in  order to maintain the fixed ex- 
change rate. The consequence of the contractionary monetary policies 
is to cause a recession in Japan and the United States. 
3.4  Implications of the Exchange Regime for Strategic Interactions 
of Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
As we noted in the beginning, one of  the most attractive aspects of 
monetary reform is the possibility of reducing the inefficient strategic 
behavior of national macroeconomic authorities. It is well known that 
if policymakers in the United States, the ROECD, and Japan indepen- 
dently select their monetary and fiscal policies,  taking as given the 
actions of the other countries, the resulting (Nash) equilibrium of mac- 
roeconomic policies is likely to be inefficient, in the sense that another 
vector of  policy parameters  could  simultaneously  raise the level of 
social welfare in all of the countries. In this brief theoretical section, 
we  illustrate how  a change  of  regime might make  the independent 
actions of national policymakers more efficient. 86  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.5  U.S. Fiscal Expansion under the McKinnon Rule 
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0.0  0.9  1.1  1.1 
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0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4 
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Consider a hypothetical situation in which two symmetric countries 
choose monetary and fiscal policies to maximize a social welfare func- 
tion in output, in the fiscal deficit, and in the level of prices  (in the 
dynamic model, the target will be the inflation rate). For simplicity, we 
assume that the welfare functions are identical and of the following 
quadratic form: 
(5)  w = -($  + p pc* + v g2), 
where  pc is  the  (log) level of  consumer prices (the foreign welfare 
function is of course a function of the corresponding foreign variables). 
The bliss points for each country are zero levels of (log) output, con- 
sumer prices, and fiscal expenditure. We  use the earlier static model 
of section 3.2, with the addition that consumer prices in each country 
are a weighted average of home prices and import prices (valued in 
domestic currency): 
Pc = q  P  + (1 -  q)  (P'  + 4 
Pc'=  TP*+  (1 - T)(P - e) 87  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Table 3.6  ROECD Fiscal Expansion under the McKinnon Rule 
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0.0  0.0 
-2.9  -2.8 
-0.1  0.0 
0.0  0.0 
1.8  1.6 
0.0  0.0 
0.4  0.3 
0.0  0.0 
-1.8  -1.7 
-0.8  -1.8 
1.1  0.7 
2.7  2.8 
-0.6  -0.6 
1.0  1.0 
3.5  3.4 
Maintaining the assumption that  domestic and foreign output prices 
are fixed, with p  = p*  = po > 0, we see that fluctuation in the ex- 
change rate is the only factor that can cause pc and pc* to change in 
the short run. 
In the case of symmetric countries, it will necessarily be the case 
that the exchange rate equals zero (e = 0). Given this fact, consumer 
prices  in each country are fixed at the level po. Since pc cannot be 
reduced in both countries simultaneously, the best symmetric solution 
is merely to live with the fact that pc is above the bliss level, and then 
to  set  g = g’  = 0,  and  m = m* = po, so  that  output  is  kept  at 
q = q* = 0.  In other words, the economies should sit at “full  em- 
ployment”  and zero budget deficit, suffering the inevitable fact that 
consumer prices are above their bliss level. 
Unfortunately, in  noncooperative policymaking under floating ex- 
change rates, this efficient equilibrium will not be reached. Each coun- 
try’s policy authorities will  believe that a strong currency option is 
available that will allow them to reduce pc, and therefore to import 
price stability (and to export inflation!). Each country will therefore 88  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
aim its monetary policy in a contractionary direction and its fiscal policy 
in  an  expansionary  direction  in  order  to  exploit  the  possible  anti- 
inflationary gains of a strong currency. Of course, this noncooperative 
outcome has all the trappings of a prisoners'  dilemma game, in that 
the two symmetric countries will be unable, simultaneously, to enjoy 
a strong currency vis-his each other! The results of the noncooper- 
ative game will  therefore be (1)  a policy mix geared toward fiscal ex- 
pansion cum monetary contraction, with a socially undesirable  level 
of fiscal deficits; (2) overly contractionary policies in total, with output 
reduced below the efficient symmetric level of q = q* = 0; and (3)  an 
exchange rate e  = 0, with pc = pc* = po, i.e., no success in  either 
country of manipulating the exchange rate to its own advantage. 
These results are easy to confirm algebraically. The home country 
maximizes the social welfare function (eq. 5)  with respect to m and g, 
taking as given the level of  m'  and g*. The foreign country makes the 
comparable policy analysis, arriving at values of m* and g*, taking as 
given m and g. At the Nash equilibrium in this symmetric case, m  = m* 
and g  = g', with the specific values of the target  variables given as 
follows (note that the multipliers dyldx in the equations are as given in 
the derivations in  section 3.2): 
q = q* = -  [p  po (1 -  q)(de/dm)]/(dq/dm)  < 0 
pc = pc* = po  > 0 
g  = g* = -  [q (dqldg) + p p  (1 -  q)(de/dg)l/u  > 0 
Remember that de/dm > 0, deldg < 0,  dqldm > 0,  dqldg > 0,  in order 
to derive the signs of the preceding expressions. Thus, output is below 
zero, while government spending is above zero. By simple substitution, 
it is easy to see that m  = m* <  po. In sum we have established the 
early  conclusions:  m  is  too tight  and g is too loose relative  to the 
efficient equilibrium, and aggregate demand overall is too tight (since 
It is important to note that the inefficiency in this game would hold 
if  the players had only one instrument, either m or g, instead of two. 
If m  and m* were fixed, with the authorities setting g and g*, there 
would still be a bias toward inefficiently large fiscal deficits, whereas 
if  g and g* are fixed while the game is played with m and m', then the 
bias is toward overcontractionary policies. In both cases, the countries 
attempt to manipulate the exchange rate in their favor (i.e., toward an 
appreciation). 
Now, consider how this game would be played under the McKinnon 
standard. In that case, policymakers choose only g and g*, since mon- 
etary policy is set according to the two rules that mw  is fixed and that 
the exchange rate  is fixed (in this case at e = 0). The cooperative 
optimum equilibrium is again the same, with q = q* = 0,  g = g*  = 0, 
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and pc = pc* = po. To  achieve this equilibrium, mw should be set at 
po, and fiscal policy in both countries should be set at zero. 
Assume now that the McKinnon rule is in place, but with each fiscal 
policy authority free to choose the level of fiscal spending in a non- 
cooperative way. Suppose also that mw  is fixed exogenously at  po  (more 
on this assumption in a moment). It now turns out that the independent 
actions of the fiscal authorities will lead to the social optimum. The 
policymaker has no incentive to try to deviate from the point of  zero 
fiscal expenditure. Higher fiscal spending no longer improves the price 
performance, as it did under the floating system, since now the ex- 
change rate is fixed at zero. Therefore fiscal expenditure merely wors- 
ens the budget deficit without any compensating benefits. These results 
are verified formally by maximizing the social welfare function at home 
with respect to g, and abroad with respect to g’. It is easy to verify 
that g  = g* = 0 constitutes a Nash equilibrium. 
To see this formally, we simply differentiate the utility function with 
respect to g, and set the results equal to zero. Under the McKinnon 
rule, deldg = 0, so that the result of differentiation is: dW/dg = 0 = 
-  [q(dq/dg)  + ug].  With mw  at po,  and g* = 0, this first-order condition 
is satisfied at 4 = 0 and g  = 0. The same result holds for the foreign 
country when g  = 0, so that the pair g  = g’  = 0 constitutes a Nash 
equilibrium. 
Thus, we have a case in which a change in monetary regime elimi- 
nates the inefficient strategic interactions of the two governments. The 
essential inefficiency of the game under floating exchange rates resulted 
from the fact that the two sides had inconsistent exchange rate targets, 
which  obviously  could  not  be  simultaneously  satisfied.  Under  the 
McKinnon  rule,  neither player  attempts or is able to influence the 
exchange rate in his favor. It must be stressed that the efficiency of 
the McKinnon solution relied heavily on two facts. First, it was as- 
sumed that the world money stock mw was at the global optimum. In 
fact, McKinnon has opted for a fixed level of mw in most discussions 
of his proposal, and there is no reason to believe that the selected value 
of mw would necessarily be at an efficient level. Second, the symmetry 
of  the model and the symmetry of the “shock”  (both countries had 
prices equally above the optimum) meant that the exchange rate did 
not have to adjust in order to adapt efficiently to the shock. In later 
sections we will study asymmetric cases, in which efficiency requires 
a change in the nominal exchange rate. 
3.5  Strategic Interactions under Alternative Regimes in the 
MSG Model 
We  now employ the large-scale simulation model to study strategic 
interactions in the dynamic case. For this purpose we use two meth- 90  Warwick J. McKibbWJeffrey D. Sachs 
odologies. In the first, we place the countries in a particular historical 
situation and study the optimal strategies of each country over time. 
A benchmark “cooperative” equilibrium is used as a benchmark with 
which to compare the performance in the alternative monetary regimes. 
In the second and more novel approach, introduced in section 3.6, we 
study the asymptotic properties  of the system under alternative ex- 
change arrangements. In that case we assume that the system is buf- 
feted through time by various stochastic disturbances, in output mar- 
kets, money markets, and elsewhere. Using a technique described in 
that  section,  we  can  calculate the steady-state variancekovariance 
structure of the target variables in each exchange regime, and thereby 
measure the average operating properties of  each system. In general, 
the MSG model is particularly well suited to this kind of analysis, since 
the model is easily reducible to a first-order difference equation system, 
which is easy to analyze using standard techniques of dynamic analysis. 
To  study the dynamic games involved in setting national policy, we 
specify a social welfare function for each of the three OECD regions. 
Social welfare in each region is specified as a function of various mac- 
roeconomic targets, such as the inflation rates, the GDP gap, the current 
account deficit, and the budget deficit. The intertemporal social welfare 
functions are written as additively separable quadratic functions of the 
targets in each period. The specific form that we employ makes social 
welfare a function of the output gap (9, consumer price index inflation 
IT, the current account deficit as a percent of GDP, denoted CA, and 
the level of the budget deficit relative to GDP, denoted D.  The specific 
function that we employ is as follows: 
W = -  C Sr[0.5  Qf  + IT:  + 0.5 CA:  + 0.6 Df] 
f=O  (6) 
6 is the social rate-of-time discount. Clearly, macroeconomic bliss is 
achieved when the GDP gap is zero, CPI inflation is zero, the current 
account is in balance, and the budget is in balance. 
Corresponding welfare functions are assumed for the ROECD and 
Japan. A couple of preliminary comments should be made about this 
welfare function. First, the results are obviously  specific to a given 
numerical specification. The inefficiency of a strategic noncooperative 
interaction will depend quantitatively on the weights attached to the 
countries’ target variables.  In the simple example of the section 3.4, 
for example, the inefficiency resulted from the fact that both countries 
were attempting simultaneously  to reduce  their price levels via ex- 
change rate appreciation. The inefficiency of the noncooperative so- 
lution in that case depends crucially on the relative weight placed by 
the countries on the inflation target. For purposes of study of our large- 
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games except through the specification of particular loss functions. The 
second point is that the loss function relates to macroeconomic targets 
(inflation, unemployment, etc.) rather than to more basic categories of 
real consumption over time. Our model does not have strong enough 
microeconomic foundations at this point to write policy targets in terms 
of the “primitives” of consumption expenditure, as might be desirable 
in a more sophisticated treatment. 
Using results of dynamic game theory, we calculate (with numerical 
dynamic programming methods) a set of fiscal policy rules in the three 
OECD regions that have the following equilibrium property: the rules 
for each country are optimal for the given country (in that they max- 
imize the dynamic social welfare function), taking as given the rules 
that are being employed in the other regions. A more rigorous statement 
of the equilibrium conditions and a discussion of the solution technique 
is given in Oudiz and Sachs (1985). The optimum we calculate is time 
consistent. That is, there is no incentive to choose a different set of 
policies if  the optimization problem is solved again at some point in 
the future.  The policies  are therefore  also credible to the forward- 
looking private agents and other countries in the model. We have shown 
elsewhere (see Sachs and McKibbin 1985), that, as in the static model 
of the section 3.4, such an equilibrium does not necessarily yield very 
attractive outcomes. These rules will likely contain some types of beggar- 
thy-neighbor policies and will therefore show some of the disadvantages 
of the classic prisoners’ dilemma. For example, in the case where both 
monetary and fiscal policies are chosen according to such rules under 
a flexible exchange rate regime, we will see that the equilibrium rules 
are likely to produce excessive budget deficits and high real interest 
rates in an inflationary environment, just as we found for the static 
model. 
It is therefore very likely that the social welfare of all of the countries 
can be enhanced by a different set of policies, chosen cooperatively. 
We  can find such a set new rules by assuming that a single “world” 
planner maximizes a single social welfare function, which is a weighted 
average of the social welfare functions of the United States, Japan, and 
the ROECD, where the weights are GNP shares. The result of this 
global optimization is a new set of rules that avoids prisoners’ dilem- 
mas. These optimal “cooperative”  rules can then be compared with 
the “noncooperative”  rules found in the first stage. In general, it will 
be the case that “cooperative” policies result in some form of managed 
float, in that global efficiency of policy setting will almost surely require 
changes in the nominal exchange rates of the three countries in the 
course of macroeconomic adjustment. 
We  use this technique to generate noncooperative rules for fiscal 
policy, given the monetary regime in place, as well as a set of coop- 92  Warwick J. McKibbinNeffrey D. Sachs 
erative  rules.  In the case of  the flexible exchange rate regime,  we 
assume that policymakers choose both monetary and fiscal policies to 
reach targets for output, inflation, the current account, and budget 
deficits. In the dollar standard case the United States is allowed to 
optimize on both monetary and fiscal policies, whereas Japan and the 
ROECD are only given the option of choosing fiscal policy. Their money 
supplies are made endogenous and are set at the levels necessary to 
keep the exchange rate unchanged, given the levels of the state vari- 
ables of the world economy, and given the levels of their own fiscal 
policies and of the monetary and fiscal policies in the other economies. 
In the McKinnon regime, each region chooses fiscal policy to reach its 
given targets.  In the “simple”  McKinnon regime, the global money 
stock is held fixed, while in  the “modified”  McKinnon  regime, the 
three regions cooperatively set the global money stock, mw,  while they 
choose their fiscal policies independently.  In each case the dynamic 
welfare function is the one we have just introduced. 
A word  must be  said about how we implement the modified Mc- 
Kinnon regime. Remember that, in that case, the global money stock 
is set cooperatively, while the individual countries set the fiscal policies 
noncooperatively. To find a “good”  rule for the global money stock, 
we employed the following iterative procedure. We  found the rule for 
global money that maximizes a global social welfare function (a GNP- 
weighted average of the individual region social welfare functions) as- 
suming that fiscal policies were also chosen cooperatively. Then, given 
the resulting rule for global money, we let the individual policymakers 
choose optimal fiscal policies in a noncooperative manner. Taking as 
given these resulting rules for fiscal policy, we then recalculated  an 
optimal cooperative rule for global money, and used that one as the 
rule to control the evolution of mw.  Ideally, the linear rule should be 
found for mw that maximizes the global welfare, subject to the con- 
straint that the fiscal rules are chosen uncooperatively by the separate 
regions.  This formulation would make the cooperative monetary au- 
thorities Stackelberg leaders with respect to the fiscal authorities of 
the individual countries. Unfortunately we have not yet been able to 
implement this more ambitious approach. 
As a formal matter, the MSG model can be written in a standard 




X,+l  = AX,  + Be, + CU, + ZE, 
,(e,+,)  = DX, + Fe, + GU, + WE, 
T, = MX, + Le, + NU, + OE, 
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Xttl  is a vector of state variables (in this case 37 x 1) 
U,  is a vector of control variables 
e,  is a vector of nonpredetermined (or “jumping”)  variables 
71  is a vector of target variables 
E,  is a vector of stochastic shocks (6x  1) 
,(e,+,) is the expectation taken at time t of the jumping variables at 
time t + 1 based on information available at time t 
The model variables  are divided into state variables X,, historically 
given at any moment; “jumping” or  forward-looking variables e,, which 
are fixed in order to place the system on the stable dynamic manifold; 
control variables  U, including fiscal and monetary policies; and sto- 
chastic shocks E,.  Assuming that in  each period the policy variables 
must be set before the stochastic shocks are observed, the policy rules 
are all written in the form: 
(10)  u, = r x, 
In  other words, the general  specification of  rules links  the control 
variables to the state variables in any period via a fixed set of linear 
rules. Of course, the linearity results from the assumption of linearity 
of the underlying model and the assumption of a quadratic social wel- 
fare function in each region. 
The dynamic game that we study in this section has the policy au- 
thorities all confronting an unanticipated  jump in nominal wage inflation 
of  10% per year, after being on a baseline path of zero inflation, zero 
GDP gap, budget balance, and current account balance. The shock hits 
in 1984, raising domestic prices in the year by 10% and setting in motion 
several years of high inflation, given the inflationary momentum built 
into the Phillips curve equation (which makes current nominal wage 
change a function of lagged nominal price  change).  In each region, 
monetary and fiscal policies are deployed in order to engineer an op- 
timal rate of disinflation, subject to the social welfare function (which 
trades off output, inflation, budget, and current account deficits) and 
subject to the policy rules taken abroad. In this analysis we assume 
that the system is nonstochastic (that is, all E are zero), returning to 
the stochastic case in the section 3.6,  when we look at the steady-state 
operating properties of the alternative regimes. 
Table 3.7 illustrates the case of optimal cooperative disinflation. Since 
all countries begin with a shock of 10% wage inflation, it is optimal to 
pursue tight macroeconomic policies in order to bring inflation down 
to zero in the period of a few years. In this case, the nominal money 
stock growth is kept low and falling, so that real money balances (not 
shown) fall sharply in the early period of disinflation. Since domestic 
prices in each of the three regions has risen by  10% in  1984, the fact 94  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.7  Cooperative Response to an Inflationary Shock under a Flexible 
Exchange Rate 
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that nominal money stocks are falling in  1984 relative to the baseline 
means that real money balances are declining by  more than  10%  in 
1984,  i.e.,  that  monetary policy is highly nonaccommodative in  the 
year of  the price shock. Also, fiscal policy is restrictive in the United 
States (where there is a surplus of 0.5% of GNP in  1984), and Japan 
(where there is a surplus of 0.8% of GNP), while fiscal policy is neutral 
in the ROECD. In all countries there is a sharp recession in  1984 of 
about 10% of  GDP relative to potential, and actual GDP reapproaches 
its potential level only slowly over time.  Note that, because of  the 
monetary stringency, there is a sharp rise in nominal short-term interest 
rates, with interest rates in 1984 rising by  15.4 percentage points in the 
United  States, by  16.1 percentage points in Japan, and by  14.8 per- 
centage points in the ROECD. Interest rates fall gradually over time, 
in line with the gradual disinflation. 
Table 3.7 shows the optimal cooperative response. Table 3.8 shows 
what happens when policy makers act independently and noncooper- 
atively, under a regime of floating exchange rates. Suddenly, everybody 
tries to maintain a strong currency in order to help fight off the infla- 95  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Table 3.8  Noncooperative Response to an Inflationary Shock under a Flexible 
Exchange Rate 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
U.S. economy 
Real GNP  %  -10.2  -8.0  -6.4  -5.2  -4.1  -3.3 
Inflation  D  9.9  5.9  4.7  3.8  3.0  2.4 
Nominal interest rate  D  19.3  14.7  11.8  9.4  7.7  6.3 
Exchange rate (Em/$)  %  1.5  0.5  -0.1  -0.7  -1.2  -1.7 
Trade balance  %GNP  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Budget deficit  %GNP  1.3  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.4 
Money supply  %  -2.5  -0.1  4.9  10.3  15.3  19.6 
Japanese economy 
Real GNP  %  -10.1  -7.8  -6.3  -5.1  -4.1  -3.3 
Inflation  D  9.1  5.3  4.3  3.5  2.8  2.3 
Nominal interest rate  D  19.9  15.6  12.7  10.3  8.6  7.3 
Exchange rate (yen/$)  %  -5.2  -4.6  -4.1  -3.7  -3.5  -3.3 
Trade balance  %GNP  -0.7  -0.6  -0.5  -0.5  -0.4  -0.3 
Budget deficit  %GNP  1.4  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5 
Money supply  %  -2.9  -  1.4  2.8  7.8  12.5  16.6 
ROECD economies 
Real GNP  %  -10.3  -8.0  -6.3  -5.0  -4.0  -3.2 
Inflation  D  10.0  5.8  4.6  3.7  2.9  2.3 
Nominal interest rate  D  18.3  14.0  11.1  8.9  7.2  5.9 
Budget deficit  %GNP  1.6  1.0  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.5 
Trade balance  %GNP  0.6  0.3  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3 
Money supply  %  -2.1  0.5  5.5  10.9  15.8  19.9 
tionary shock. Each country therefore has more expansionary fiscal 
policy than in the cooperative solution (the United States, for example, 
runs a budget deficit of  1.3% of GNP in  1984) and has more contrac- 
tionary monetary policy than in the cooperative case. The result is that 
noncooperation under floating leads to very high world interest rates, 
since the whole world is tilted toward fiscal expansion and monetary 
contraction. U.S. nominal interest rates jump by 19.3 percentage points 
in  the noncooperative floating rate case, whereas they increased by 
only 14.8 percentage points in the cooperative policy response. 
In tables 3.9 and 3.10 we ask what happens when the same shock oc- 
curs in a regime of fixed exchange rates, first under a dollar standard and 
then under a modified McKinnon rule. The notable point about the dol- 
lar standard is that the United States still has an incentive to pursue fiscal 
expansion and monetary contraction,  just as under the floating rate case. 
A fiscal expansion in the United States reduces output abroad (we noted 
the negative transmission in sections 3.2 and 3.3), and thereby lowers 
foreign inflation. Lower foreign inflation in turn lowers U.S. import 
prices. Similarly, a U.S. monetary contraction has the same side-effect. 96  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.9  Noncooperative Response to an Inflationary Shock under a 
Dollar Standard 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  - 
U.S. economy 
Real GNP  %  -  10.5  -8.3  -6.6  -5.2 
Inflation  D  9.9  5.7  4.5  3.5 
Nominal interest rate  D  22.8  18.1  14.4  11.5 
Exchange rate (Ecu/$)  %  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Trade balance  %GNP  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0 
Budget deficit  %GNP  2.8  2.2  1.9  1.5 
















Real GNP  %  -9.8  -7.7  -6.2  -5.0  -4.1  -3.4 
Inflation  D  9.7  5.8  4.7  3.7  3.0  2.4 
Nominal interest rate  D  22.8  18.2  14.6  11.7  9.6  8.0 
Exchange rate (yen/$)  %  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Trade balance  %GNP  0.1  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.4  -0.4 
Budget deficit  %GNP  1.3  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5 
Money supply  %  -4.1  -2.5  2.4  7.9  13.1  17.6 
ROECD economies 
Real GNP  %  -10.7  -8.1  -6.3  -4.8  -3.8  -2.9 
Inflation  D  9.8  5.6  4.5  3.6  2.9  2.4 
Nominal interest rate  D  22.8  18.4  15.0  12.3  10.2  8.6 
Budget deficit  %GNP  4.4  3.2  2.5  1.9  1.4  1.0 
Trade balance  %GNP  0.4  0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3 
Money supply  %  -4.3  -2.9  1.7  7.2  12.4  17.0 
Thus, the United States, as center of the monetary system, shifts its 
policy mix in a direction intended to promote very sharp disinflation 
abroad. In the other countries, expansionary budget policies are un- 
dertaken defensively, in order to limit the extent of disinflation and eco- 
nomic contraction implicit in the US.  policies. The result is that, like 
the floating rate case, each country is led to pursue a policy mix of large 
budget deficits and very contractionary monetary policies. World inter- 
est rates shoot up, and the world falls into recession, 
Table 3.10, under the modified McKinnon regime, shows the advan- 
tage of  this regime in fighting a global inflationary shock. As we saw 
in the theoretical analysis of section 3.4, countries no longer have the 
incentive to run large budget deficits under the McKinnon regime, since 
they know that they cannot get disinflationary benefits from such a 
policy mix. Therefore they all  choose to have lower budget deficits 
than in the noncooperative equilibrium under floating, and than in the 
noncooperative equilibrium under the dollar standard. In this sense, 
the shift in regime almost substitutes for the cooperation assumed in 
table  3.7.  World  interest  rates  rise  much  less  under  the  modified 
McKinnon plan than under the other noncooperative regimes. 97  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Table 3.10  Noncooperative Response to an Inflationary Shock under the 
McKinnon  Rule 
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-10.0  -8.0  -6.5  -5.2  -4.2  -3.4 
9.9  5.9  4.7  3.7  3.0  2.3 
16.6  13.3  10.6  8.4  6.8  5.6 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
-  1.2  1.2  6.0  11.2  16.0  20.1 
-8.3  -7.0  -6.0  -5.1  -4.4  -3.8 
9.7  6.3  5.2  4.2  3.3  2.6 
16.6  13.1  10.2  7.9  6.2  5.0 
0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
-0.1  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5 
-  1.3  -1.1  -0.9  -0.7  -0.4  -0.2 
-0.7  2.4  7.7  13.2  18.3  22.5 
-10.5  -8.1  -6.3  -5.0  -3.9  -3.0 
9.8  5.7  4.5  3.7  3.0  2.4 
16.6  13.3  10.6  8.4  6.8  5.6 
1.2  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.2  0.1 
-  1.4  0.8  5.6  10.8  15.7  19.9 
0.3  0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
We  can make a formal comparison of the outcomes of  the four re- 
gimes by measuring the intertemporal welfare function, starting in 1984, 
for all of the countries, given the different adjustment paths. The results 
of this comparison are as follows: 
us.  Japan  ROECD 
Cooperative case  -  14.884  -  13.416  -  14.626 
Noncooperative case  -  14.983  -  13.441  -  14.886 
Dollar standard  -  15.381  -  14.286  -  15.644 
Modified McKinnon  -  14.739  -  14.239  -  14.695 
Comparing the noncooperative with the cooperative case we see that 
each country has a lower loss under cooperation. The dollar standard 
leads uniformally to the largest loss. For  the United  States and the 
ROECD, the McKinnon rule performs well relative to the noncoop- 
erative case, but it is worse for Japan. The ranking of noncooperation 
and the McKinnon rule is therefore ambiguous. 
The results have  shown that national welfare in responding to an 
exogenous shock will be altered by the nature of the monetary regime, 98  Wamick J. McKibbWJeffrey D. Sachs 
and that at least for one shock (a global inflationary disturbance), the 
symmetric fixed exchange rate regime envisioned by McKinnon might 
have some merit. However, it is extremely inappropriate to draw con- 
clusions about the relative merits of exchange rate regimes from one 
type of shock. In the next section we enrich the comparison among 
regimes by using a technique that allows us to examine regime per- 
formance under a variety of disturbances. 
3.6  Asymptotic Properties of Alternative Regimes 
Our second approach to comparing interactions under alternative 
exchange regimes uses a technique developed in McKibbin and Sachs 
(1985),  in  which we  calculate the steady-state  variances of a set of 
targets when the model is subject to a range of stochastic shocks, and 
when national policymakers optimize their policy choices with respect 
to a social welfare function. Related methods have been employed by 
Currie and Levine (1985). In the illustration in this section, the sto- 
chastic shocks are included in equations for aggregate demand, prices, 
and money demand in both the United States and the ROECD. It is 
assumed that in each period  the shocks hit after the policies are in 
place, so that the policy choices are not conditioned on the realizations 
of the disturbances hitting the system within the period. 
Under our assumption of an additively separable, quadratic social 
welfare function, average operating welfare of  an economy in a par- 
ticular monetary regime can be written in terms of the variances and 
covariances of the target variables under the particular regime. The 
numerical techniques in this section allow us to determine the asymp- 
totic variancekovariance matrices for the target variables for each of 
the countries, and thereby to determine the average welfare levels of 
the economies under each of the regimes. For each regime, we proceed 
as follows. Optimal rules of adjustment, in the form 
u; = rx,  i = United States, ROECD, and Japan 
are calculated for each country, using the dynamic programming so- 
lutions shown in section 3.5. We may then substitute these rules back 
into the structural equations of the model. Given the asymptotic variance/ 
covariance structure of the shocks, we can then solve for the asymp- 
totic variancekovariance structure of the target variables. Given these 
results, it  is possible  to calculate the asymptotic level  of  expected 
welfare for each country under each regime by a method described 
later in this section. In this way we can find out which regimes are 
most attractive independent of the initial conditions of the economy, 
in other words, in the long-run operating characteristics. 99  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Since the technique is somewhat technical, it is worth spelling out 
in some detail. Once again, we begin with the state-space representation 
of the model, as reproduced here from equations 7 to 9: 
(7’)  X,+l=  AX,  + Be, + CU, + ZE 
(8‘)  ,(e,+ 1)  = DX,  + Fe, + GU, + WE, 
(9’)  7, = MX,  + Le, + NU, + OE~ 
We now make several assumptions about the stochastic disturbances. 
They all enter additively  so certainty equivalence holds.  All shocks 
have persistent effects in the model. This is because the shocks enter 
into dynamic equations which cause the effects of the shocks to prop- 
agate over time. The shocks to the aggregate demand equation (E~)  are 
entered explicitly in the following way: 
FI+1 = -75 (p,,  1 + EaI 
where p,,  becomes part of the state vector X,. 
The other shocks, although serially uncorrelated, are persistent be- 
cause of the dynamic specification of the model: the price shocks are 
built into a wage-price spiral in the model, and disturbances to money 
demand affect future money demand because of a lagged adjustment 
specification of the money demand equation (which makes the future 
demand for real money balances a function of  the lagged level of real 
money balances). 
The shocks also satisfy the following conditions: 
E,-l(E,) = 0 
E,-,(E,E,T)  = I: 
Policy rules are written in the form: 
(lo‘)  u, = rlx, 
where U,  is the stacked vector consisting of the policy instruments of 
the individual regions, Vj,  i=  United States, ROECD, and Japan. 
The policy rule may be the result of an optimization procedure (the 
case that we study in this section), or may be chosen by some other 
arbitrary technique. In other words, the technique in the section can 
be used to analyze each individual’s favorite “optimal”  policy rule, 
whether or not that rule is derived from a formal optimization procedure. 
Given a specification of a policy rule, and given the structural equa- 
tions of the system in equations (7’) to (97, we find the stable manifold 
for the “jumping”  variables e,: 
(1  1)  e, = HIX,  + H2e, 100  Warwick J. McKibbWJeffrey D. Sachs 
(This equation can be derived through various procedures, including 
the closed-form solutions of Blanchard and Kahn [1980], or by various 
iterative techniques, one of which we have developed and used here). 
Then, by substituting (1 1) into (7'): 
(12) 
where 
XI+,  = AXf + ZE, 
A = A  + BH, + cr, 
and  z = Z  + BH, 
With the system written in the canonical form of a first-order sto- 
chastic difference  equation, as in  (12), it is straightforward, though 
tedious, to calculate the asymptotic variancekovariance structure of 
the state variables X.  Once these are calculated, it is possible to use 
the equation for the target variables T,  in order to calculate the variance/ 
covariance matrix  of  the target  variables.  A  full description of  the 
numerical techniques used to get to this point is provided in McKibbin 
and Sachs (1985). 
Once the variancekovariance matrix of the target variables is known, 
we can also calculate the expected utility loss given some arbitrary 
welfare function. 
9 
Let ll = E(TTT),  and utility U  = EP'TWT 
where  W is a diagonal matrix with weights for each target along the 
diagonal. Then, 
(13)  E(TWT)  = TrE(Wd)  = Tr(WII). 
Thus we find 
f =o 
(14) 
Using the procedures just outlined we can now calculate the variance 
of targets under the alternative monetary regimes.  For each regime, 
we calculate optimal policy rules of the form given in equation (lo), 
and then we derive the asymptotic variancekovariance structures of 
the target variables. Rather than summarizing the results by presenting 
a single expected welfare level for each regime, as in equation (14), 
we instead report the asymptotic variances of the key variables, so 
that the reader can see how well the alternative regimes do in stabilizing 
the target variables in the world economy. (For convenience, the results 
are actually reported as standard deviations, rather than variances.) 
These results are reported in tables 3.11 to 3.13, which present the 
standard deviations of output, inflation, the current account and the 
fiscal deficit in the United States and the ROECD, given shocks to 
E(u)  = Tr(WrI>/(l - p) 101  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Table 3.11  Standard Deviation of Targets  under Aggregate Demand Shocks 
Pure  Cooperative  Noncooperative 
float  float  float  McKinnon I  McKinnon 11 

























0.678  0.584  0.636  0.590  0.629 











0.557  0.474  0.525  0.497  0.530 
0.905  0.002  0.048  0.093  0.506 
~~ 
ROECD Demand Shock 
U.S. 
Output  1.031  0.629  0.627  0.651  0.673 
Inflation  0.648  0.408  0.406  0.217  0.376 
Current 
account  0.251  0.236  0.234  0.222  0.352 
Fiscal 
deficit  0.015  0.053  0.089  0.355  0.803 
ROECD 
Output  2.114  1.383  1.382  3.636  3.554 
Inflation  0.929  0.456  0.456  1.407  1.342 
Current 
account  0.300  0.319  0.329  0.352  0.498 
Fiscal 
deficit  0.003  0.037  0.054  1.635  1.168 
aggregate demand, prices, and monetary velocity in each of these re- 
gions. Each row of numbers in the tables correspond to the asymptotic 
standard error of each target when the economy is subject to a given 
stochastic shock, within a given monetary regime. Results are reported 
for five types of monetary regimes: (1) a pure float, in which no policy 
actions are taken in any country (i.e., pure laissez-faire); (2) a coop- 
erative float, in which all of the instruments in all of the countries are 
cooperatively  controlled  by  a  central  authority,  who  maximizes  a 
weighted sum of regional utilities; (3) a noncooperative float, in which 
monetary and fiscal policies are selected in a noncooperative way by 
the macroeconomic authorities in each of the countries; (4)  the simple 102  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.12  Standard Deviation of Targets under Price Shocks 
Pure  Cooperative  Noncooperative 
float  float  float  McKinnon I  McKinnon II 



















0.692  0.670  0.377  0.266  0.278 














































0.235  0.469  0.149  0.134  0.092 




























McKinnon rule (I), with fixed exchange rates and a constant level of 
global money; and  (5) a modified McKinnon rule (11), in  which the 
global money is cooperatively controlled in the way outlined in section 
3.5. 
Consider, for example, the effects of a unit shock to U.S. aggregate 
demand, under the alternative regimes given in table 3.1 1. The standard 
deviation of the shock itself is  1%  of U.S.  GDP (the corresponding 
shock in the ROECD has a standard deviation of one percent of ROECD 
GDP). Under a pure laissez-faire float, (denoted “pure float” in the 103  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
Table 3.U  Standard Deviation of Targets under Money Velocity Shocks 
Pure  Cooperative  Noncooperative 
float  float  float  McKinnon I  McKinnon 11 
U.S.  Money Shock 
U.S. 
Output  1.628  1.546  1.550  0.631  0.633 
Inflation  0.505  0.604  0.607  0.233  0.276 
Current 
account  0.162  0.168  0.174  0.077  0.063 
Fiscal 
deficit  0:001  0.041  0.070  0.164  0.019 
ROECD 
Output  0.272  0.122  0.126  0.936  0.888 
Inflation  0.112  0.046  0.048  0.337  0.347 
Current 
account  0.153  0.162  0.168  0.094  0.081 
Fiscal 
deficit  O.OO0  0.055  0.006  0.267  0.060 
ROECD Money Shock 
U.S. 
Output  0.291  0.060  0.039  0.629  0.630 
Inflation  0.113  0.068  0.055  0.234  0.275 
Current 
account  0.068  0.058  0.033  0.079  0.063 
Fiscal 
deficit  0.002  0.071  0.015  0.172  0.019 
ROECD 
Output  2.184  1.955  1.976  0.935  0.885 
Inflation  0.666  0.772  0.787  0.339  0.346 
Current 
account  0.086  0.068  0.054  0.094  0.081 
Fiscal 
deficit  0.001  0.086  0.108  0.284  0.060 
table), the unit shock to aggregate demand induces an asymptotic stan- 
dard deviation in real output in the United States of  2.164% of  GDP. 
Under a global cooperative arrangement, the standard deviation is re- 
duced to  1.534% of  U.S.  GDP.  If the United States is stabilizing by 
itself, in a noncooperative flexible exchange rate regime, and if  the 
stabilization is such as to minimize the social welfare function intro- 
duced earlier, then the variability of  U.S. GDP due to pure demand 
shocks is reduced still further, to 1.490% of  U.S. GDP. The shock, of 
course, also induces fluctuations in inflation and in the current account- 104  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
GDP ratio (the table records the standard deviation of both of these 
variables when measured in percentage points; i.e., the standard de- 
viation of 0.932 in U.S. inflation signifies a standard deviation of just 
under one percentage point of annual inflation). 
The key point in table 3.11 is that the fixed exchange rate systems 
(McKinnon I and McKinnon 11) are destabilizing for the real GDPs of 
both the United States and the ROECD when US.  aggregate demand 
is  hit  by  stochastic  shocks.  In  a floating rate  system, some of  the 
demand shock is automatically muted as the floating rate appreciates 
and  thereby  shifts  some  of  aggregate  demand  abroad.  Under  the 
McKinnon  rule,  however,  if  the  United  States is  hit  by  a  positive 
aggregate demand  shock, the U.S.  money  supply automatically  ex- 
pands, enough to forestall any appreciation of the exchange rate. The 
demand shock is then magnified in the United States, as it is amplified 
by a monetary expansion. Abroad, we have already seen, the foreign 
money supply contracts under the rules of the game, and the foreign 
economy actually  slumps. For  this  kind  of  shock, it  doesn’t really 
matter whether the global money stock is fixed (as in the McKinnon 
I) or varied cooperatively (as in McKinnon 11), though it is not clear 
to us why there is not more gain to a coordinated monetary response. 
Note, finally, that some policy is better than none, since the cooperative 
and noncooperative floating rate policies dominate the laissez-faire re- 
sponse in all cases. 
When we turn our attention to price shocks, in table 3.12, little of 
this conclusion is changed. In almost all cases, cooperative or non- 
cooperative floating is better than either laissez-faire or a fixed ex- 
change rate. This result is really not surprising, in that a nominal price 
or wage shock in one country (due, for example, to a temporary pro- 
ductivity decline, to wage militancy, etc.) is best absorbed in the world 
markets through a depreciation of the currency of the inflating country. 
In this way, there is a substantial gain in the stability of  real output, 
with only a slight decline in the stability of the inflation rate (note that 
the laissez-faire policies and the pure McKinnon rule have a very slightly 
lower variance of inflation than do the floating rate rules). 
Why is it that the McKinnon rule seemed stabilizing in the inflation 
game of section 3.5, but seems rather unattractive in the present con- 
text? The reason is that the previous game studied a case in which all 
countries simultaneously are faced with a price shock, whereas in table 
3.12 the price shocks in the United States or the ROECD are considered 
to be  independently distributed.  This distinction is potentially  very 
important in  that when the price shocks are independent, it  is useful 
to allow for nominal exchange rate  variability across the countries, 
while when the shocks are highly correlated, the need for exchange 
rate  movements  is very  much reduced, and the benefit  to reducing 105  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
cross-country strategic actions that cancel each other out, is likewise 
increased. For that reason, the methodology in this section is somewhat 
biased against a fixed exchange rate system. 
Table 3.13 refers to velocity shocks in the money demand equations 
in the United States and the ROECD. Once again, we study the case 
in which the shocks are independently distributed. Now we have an 
interesting and intuitively plausible finding: a fixed rate regime stabi- 
lizes the economy of the country that experiences the monetary shock, 
but destabilizes the economy of the other country. Consider concretely 
what happens when U.S. money demand rises, under the alternative 
systems (remember that the shock is unobserved within the period that 
it occurs). Under floating rates, the economy with rising money demand 
experiences a currency appreciation and a corresponding decline in 
aggregate demand, resulting from the fall in national competitiveness. 
The other economies experience either a modest gain or fall in output: 
competitiveness improves, but export markets shrink since the econ- 
omy with  rising money  demand  goes into recession.  Now, under a 
McKinnon rule, the economy with rising money demand would auto- 
matically have an accommodating increase in money, as the monetary 
authority expands money enough to keep the exchange rate pegged. 
The other economy, however, would be forced to contract the money 
supply under the rules of the game, so that its economy could be greatly 
destabilized. 
Once again, the conclusions would look much more appealing to the 
McKinnon rule once we allow for a negative correlation across coun- 
tries in the money shocks. Suppose, for example, that the money shocks 
in the United States and the ROECD are perfectly negatively corre- 
lated. The results for this case are given in table 3.14. In this case the 
McKinnon rule is close to being perfectly stabilizing, since the country 
with expanding money demand automatically has a rising money sup- 
ply, while the country with the contracting money demand automati- 
cally has a falling money supply. The other regimes perform far worse 
than the McKinnon rule for this particular type of shock, which indeed 
is the type of shock stressed by McKinnon. 
A full analysis of the costs and benefits of the alternative systems 
would require a more complete investigation of the covariance structure 
of the underlying shocks, something that we hope to do in future work. 
3.7  Conclusions 
This chapter has analyzed the implications of alternative monetary 
regimes in the OECD for the transmission of  fiscal policy and for the 
efficiency of strategic interactions across the major OECD economies. 
While the work is tentative, we have already arrived at several useful 106  Warwick J. McKibbinNeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.14  Standard Deviation of Targets under Negatively Correlated U.S. 
and ROECD Money Shocks 
Pure  Cooperative  Noncooperative 
float  float  float  McKinnon I  McKinnon  I1 
U.S. 
Output  1.608  1.490  1.518  0.002  0.002 
Inflation  0.430  0.549  0.569  0.001  0.001 
Current 
account  0.174  0.188  0.176  0.000  0.000 
Fiscal 
deficit  0.004  0.111  0.058  0.000  O.OO0 
ROECD 
Output  2.386  2.076  2.101  0.003  0.003 
Inflation  0.680  0.794  0.812  0.001  0.001 
Current 
account  0.135  0.173  0.164  0.000  O.OO0 
Fiscal 
deficit  0.001  0.141  0. I03  0.001  0.000 
conclusions. First, the nature  of fiscal interactions will vary greatly 
depending on the nature of  the monetary regime. Under floating ex- 
change rates, transmission of  fiscal policy tends to be positive, while 
under a fixed rate system, of the sort propounded by McKinnon, fiscal 
policy can actually be negatively transmitted. In asymmetric monetary 
systems, such as a dollar standard, U.S.  fiscal policy  may  well be 
negatively transmitted, while foreign fiscal policy is almost surely pos- 
itively transmitted to the United States. These theoretical findings are 
supported by simulation experiments in a large-scale multiregion model 
of the world economy (the MSG model). The quantitative estimates 
show that negative transmission of fiscal policy under a fixed exchange 
rate regime is more than a theoretical curiosity and is at the least a real 
empirical possibility, if not likelihood. 
One of the alleged advantages of a move to fixed exchange rates is 
that it would mute the incentives for beggar-thy-neighbor policies under 
flexible exchange rates. We  illustrated that proposition in two ways, 
first using a simple theoretical model,  and, second, by examining a 
differential game in which the large three OECD regions all inherit a 
high inflation rate and then use macroeconomic policies in the attempt 
to pursue  an optimal  disinflation.  As we  show, the noncooperative 
floating regime tends to create an incentive toward fiscal expansion 
and monetary contraction that is inefficient from the point of  view of 
the social welfare functions in the individual countries. 107  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
A  new methodology is used at the end to examine the "average" 
operating properties of the alternative systems. The question of which 
system is best is shown to depend on which stochastic disturbances 
are dominant, a standard result in the analysis of fixed versus flexible 
rates. The results, on the whole, are relatively hostile to fixed exchange 
rates, but that might depend on our specification of  the shocks. As is 
described in the text, price shocks that are positively correlated across 
countries, or money demand shocks that are negatively correlated across 
countries, will both tend to be relatively well handled by fixed exchange 
rate regimes. 
Appendix 
MSG Model of the World Economy 
U.S.  Equations 
Qu = Du  + Gu + (CO, + CJ, + Cfj + CP,) - (AOCg + AJC,U 
+ ALCf + ATY) 
Ao  = PoEo/Pu 
AJ = PJEJ/Pu 
AL = PL/Pu 
AP = Pp/Pu 
Du  = (1 - s)(Qu - Tu) + 8Hu - .5vru - .5vR' 
HU = Bu + Af - A8 -  AP, -  AJ  U 
BY,,  = (BY  + DEFY)/(l + n) 
DEFU = GU + ruBu - vuBf - TU 
MYIPY  = {QY+(l + iY)-@}.5  {MY-l/PY-,}.5 
iY  = rY  + TY,~ 
r,U  = RY  - (,RE, -  RY)/RY 
vY = .13rY  + .82vKI 
Try,# = (PY,I -  PY)/PY 
TFS  = (PF$  -  PFu)/Py 
TY,~  = nFu + OQY  + T(QY - Q,U1) 108  Warwick J. McKibbinNeffrey D. Sachs 109  Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
ROECD Equations 
Q*  = Do + Go + (Cg + Ch  + CP,  + CJ,) - (CO, + C,OAJ 
+ CfAL + CpOAP)/Ao 
Do = (1 - s)(Qo - TO) - vro  + 6Ho 
Ho = Bo  + AO,/Ao  + A2 -  A$/Ao 
BE, = (BY + DEF,O)/(I  + n) 
DEFO = Go + roBo - voB*  L - TO 
M,O/P,O = {Q,O+(I + i,O)-p}.s  {MY- JPP_  I}.5 
io =  0 
v,O  = .13r,O + .82~,O-~ 
t  rr  +  ..%'+I 
@+'+I  = (P,O+, -  P,O)/P,O 
TrFq  = (PFS -  pcO)/PCO  tr 
= .rFo  + ClQY  + dQ,O - QFJ 
PCO = (pO)~9(pu/EO)y  lo(PL/Eo)yi  I (PJ  EJ  /Eo)~n(f'P/Eo)(  1 -  w -  YIO -  YI  I  ~  Y  12 1 
CO, = a8(Do + G0)(A0)'.5 
CJO  = ag(Do + Go)(AJ/Ao)-1.5 
Cf  = alo(Do + Go)(AL/Ao)-l.O 
CpO  = a'+Il(Do  + Go)(AP/Ao)-0.2 
TBO  = (Cg + CL,  + CP,  + CJ,) - (CO, + CJOAJ + CfAL 
+ C$?AP)/Ao 
AOUr+l  = (A$?,  + CA,OY(I  + n) - [(A2 + Bf)r+iA,O 
- (Af  + BP),A0/(l + n) -  APOril  + AP,J(I  + n)] 
CAO = (AO, -  Ag)ru + (AfAo)rO  + (B2A0)vo + TBoAo 
(AO, -  AP,),/A," = a[ry - + -  -  A,O)/A,Ol + OH? 110  Warwick J. McKibbidJeffrey D. Sachs 
OPEC Equations 
Pp = (PL??~(POEO)IIS(P~E~JEJ)~(P~)(~~~~-~~-JEJ)~)  (Cy  + CpO  + C$ + C$P' 
CP,  = q4(CP, + AOCP,  + ALCf + AJC$') 
CP,  = qs(CP,  + AOCg  + ALCf + AJC$')/Ao 
C$' = q6(CpU  + AOCP,  + hLCf + AJC$')/AJ 
Cf  = (1 -  q4 -  q5 -  qJ(CP,  + A°Cg  + ALCf + AJC$')/AL 
Hp = AP, + AP,  + Af  + AJAJ 
TBp = AP(C!d + C?  + C$ + CJ,) - CP, - AOCP, - ALCf - AJCJ 
CAjP  = ([JI(C)!  + C?  + Cfi + C$)t(PP/Pq,  -  HjP-II  + nHf-1 111  Coordination  of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Industrial Economies 
At,+,  = (At, + CAM1 + n) - [UP, + AD,+, + A$‘,+,& 
- (A$ + Af + A$’A-’),/(l + n)l 
A$,+, = {b,[(ApU + A5 + Af  + A$’A;),+,(l + n) 
A$’,+,A{ = {b2[(AP,  + AP, + Af + A$’AJt),,,(l + n) 
- (At  + AP, + Af + AJPAP),]  + A&}/(I  + n) 




























*x,  + I 
V 
Claims on countryj held by private creditors in country i 
Claims on countryj held by official creditors in country  i 
Government debt of  country i 
Consumption by country i of the output of country j 
Current account 
Domestic absorption 
Developing country debt 
Government deficit 
Exchange rate ($/Ecu) 
Exchange rate ($/yen) 
Government expenditure 
Real financial wealth 
Nominal interest rate 
Nominal money supply 
Growth rate 
Price level of  country i goods 
Consumer price index 
Domestic price inflation 
Consumer price inflation 
Gross domestic product 
Real short interest rate 
Real long interest rate 
Taxes 
Trade balance 
Concessional real interest rate 
Real exchange rate 
Expectation of X,  + I  based on period t information 
Superscripts and Subscripts 
U  United States 
0  Rest of  OECD 
J  Japan 
L  Developing Countries 
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~~ 
Parameter Values 
S  = 0.3 
SJ  = 0.5 
It  = 0.2 
6  = 0.1 
n  = 0.03 
+  = 0.8 
p  = 0.9 
R  = 0.2 
7  = 0.2 
71  = 0.922 
72  = 0.034 
y3  = 0.024 
y4  = 0.013 
y5  = 0.893 
76  = 0.022 
y7  = 0.020 
ys  = 0.026 
y9  = 0.911 
ylo  = 0.032 
= 0.028 
y12  = 0.010 
ag  = 0.034 
= 0.024 
a2  = 0.008 
a3  = 0.013 
a4  = 0.022 
a5  = 0.020 
a6  = 0.026 
a7  = 0.039 
as  = 0.032 
ag  = 0.010 
= 0.028 
a11  = 0.019 
u  =4 
0.J  =I 
0  = 0.5 
q1  = 0.195 
q2 = 0.353 
q3  = 0.145 
q4  = 0.092 
qs  = 0.323 
~6  = 0.109 
yL = 0.5 
yp  = 0.5 
al  = 0.110 
a2  = 0.230 
a3  = 0.010 
a4  = 0.130 
61  = 0.226 
62  = 0.070 
o  = 0.9 
E  = 0.3 
5  = 1.985 
IJ  = 1.65 
5  = 0.29 
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Comment  William H. Branson 
This paper begins by  reviewing some basic analytical results on the 
transmission of disturbances between economies under alternative ex- 
change rate regimes. These are the basis for the case for coordination; 
it is expected to reduce the negative effects of transmission. The paper 
then goes on to report numerical results for simulation using the global 
model developed by McKibbin and Sachs, which the authors dub the 
MSG model. The model-based results progress from simple illustrations 
of transmission in section 3.3 to optimal coordination results in sections 
3.5 and 3.6. Readers of the paper should keep in mind that the authors, 
while referring to the model as “empirical,”  are also careful to point 
out that the parameters of the model are not estimated but “chosen to 
be consistent with values found in the empirical literature”  (sec. 3.3). 
In a sense, then, the paper is rather more about the model, and less 
about the effect of coordination in the world, than would be the case 
if the model were actually estimated. By the end of the paper the reader 
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knows quite a lot about the model, and may even feel a little overdosed 
on MSG! 
In this comment I offer a brief reader’s guide to the paper, with my 
own views interspersed. This may  help to lighten the MSG dosage. 
The comment ends with some observations on research on coordina- 
tion, and the place of the McKibbin-Sachs work in this context. 
The results of the basic Mundell model for the transmission of fiscal 
policy are reviewed in  section 3.2 under three  alternative exchange 
rate regimes-clean float, all  others peg to the dollar, and modified 
McKinnon, with  exchange rates  and  a  weighted  average  of  money 
stocks fixed. The analytical results are influenced by  use of a fixed- 
price assumption. In the case of the clean float, fiscal policy is positively 
transmitted; an increase in spending in the United States raises interest 
rates and appreciates the dollar, giving a stimulus to net exports abroad. 
The European argument that this effect may be offset by the depressive 
effect of higher interest rates on investment is ruled out by the fixed- 
price assumption. In the money market equation (2), if m* -  p*  is fixed, 
an increase in  i requires an increase in q* to maintain equilibrium. If 
p* were permitted  to rise, the positive transmission result would be- 
come ambiguous. 
Under the dollar standard with the U.S. money stock fixed, foreign 
monetary policy must tighten to keep the dollar from appreciating. This 
produces an investment effect abroad that may offset the trade effect 
from the U.S. expansion. The result depends on the sign of y  -a+& 
the q* multiplier under the dollar standard. The econometric results in 
Branson (1984a, 198413) suggest that the dollar standard results are most 
relevant.  U.S.  monetary policy  seems focused on domestic targets, 
while European policy reacts to the exchange rate. 
Under the modified McKinnon rule, exchange rates are fixed along 
with a weighted average world money supply. So with U.S. fiscal ex- 
pansion,  U.S. monetary policy is also eased, reducing the required 
tightening abroad to keep the dollar from appreciating. This procedure 
will work only in a world of perfect asset substitutability where only 
the ratio of money supplies matters for the exchange rate. This pure 
monetary model of exchange rate determination is under a heavy em- 
pirical  cloud,  however.  In  any  event, the modified  McKinnon  rule 
provides a muted version of the dollar standard results, with negative 
transmission less likely. 
The same experiments are performed in section 3.3 using the MSG 
simulation model, a computerized version of the dynamized Mundell 
model of Dornbusch (1976). It has sticky wages and prices, income- 
constrained consumers, and very high asset substitutability. The spec- 
ification of the three OECD areas, United States, Japan, rest of OECD 
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(1979) own work on the asymmetries in wage behavior across these 
areas. 
Tables 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 confirm that the MSG computer can indeed 
reproduce the Dornbusch-Mundell results.  With floating rates (table 
3.1) and a fixed path of the U.S. money stock, a fiscal expansion in 
the United States raises interest rates and the Ecu and yen prices of 
the dollar, but also gives a short-run stimulus to real GNP in Japan 
and the ROECD. The wage and price reaction reverses this positive 
transmission after three years. With the dollar standard (table 3.3), the 
money stock and output fall in Japan and ROECD. Under the modified 
McKinnon rule (table 3.9,  U.S. money increases, so that money tight- 
ens less in  Japan  and  the ROECD, and the reduction  in output is 
reduced. 
The coordination part of the paper begins in section 3.4 with a two- 
country example of strategic interaction of policy in a modification of 
the static Mundell model of section 3.2. The crucial assumptions in 
this section are the shift to using the CPI with an import component 
as the price index, and inclusion of the fiscal deficit g explicitly in the 
welfare function of equation (3,  as well as output q and the price index. 
The standard noncooperative game result is that each country reacts 
to a common inflation shock by tightening monetary policy and easing 
fiscal policy to get an offsetting price effect from the exchange rate. 
Of course they both fail; and, with no predictable effect on the exchange 
rate, they both end up with tighter money and easier fiscal policy than 
intended or expected, and a failed attempt at competitive appreciation. 
McKibbin and Sachs introduce a suboptimal result for real outputs 
into the scenario by including the fiscal deficit in the welfare function. 
Now as each country eases fiscal policy, welfare falls. Note that g and 
g*  enter the welfare function symmetrically around their target levels. 
The fall in welfare induces each country to ease fiscal policy a little 
less, and to permit output q to absorb some of the welfare loss. 
The inefficiency of this noncooperative game is eliminated by the 
modified McKinnon rule in this example. The essential argument is 
that fixing the exchange rate removes the temptation to manipulate it 
via monetary policy in order to offset an exogenous inflation shock. 
So there is no attempt to twist monetary and fiscal policy, and no need 
to trade off q against g  in the welfare function. The optimal result is 
efficiently to swallow the exogenous inflation shock, rather than to 
attempt to dampen it via a competitive appreciation. The difficulty that 
arises here is the hidden problem of  incentives. What eliminates the 
incentive for a monetary authority to try to cheat on the system a little? 
This problem is in the background for the rest of the paper. 
In section 3.5, McKibbin and Sachs turn to strategic interactions and 
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in equation (6), includes both the fiscal deficit and the current account 
balance explicitly. This implies that the specification of “bliss” includes 
national saving equal to domestic investment for each area. Inclusion 
of policy variables explicitly in the welfare function opens the possi- 
bility that differentiation among policy choices is built into the results 
by assumption. 
The noncooperative solutions for policy using MSG assume each 
area chooses its fiscal rule taking the others as given, in the face of a 
common inflation shock. These are Nash  equilibria for each of  the 
monetary regimes. These can be compared with the cooperative regime 
where a world planner, or the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) of 
OECD, maximizes a GNP-weighted  world welfare index. The non- 
cooperative dollar standard solution has the United States maximizing 
on monetary and fiscal policy. This then constrains Japanese and ROECD 
monetary policy; so they maximize on fiscal policy only. In the modified 
McKinnon case, the EPC chooses a path for weighted world money, 
assuming optimal fiscal policies. This fixes world money, and then, in 
the noncooperative solution, each area chooses fiscal policy indepen- 
dently, taking the others as given. Again, the incentives that bind mon- 
etary authorities are not specified. 
The MSG results for the common inflation shock are puzzling. Com- 
parison of tables 3.7 and 3.8 for the floating rate cooperative and non- 
cooperative solution reveals virtually  no difference in the output or 
inflation paths. The main result of noncooperation is the twist toward 
tighter money and easier fiscal policy with higher interest rates. Pre- 
sumably the slight superiority of the cooperative case on the welfare 
measure (section 3.5) comes from inclusion of the fiscal balance in the 
welfare measure. Comparison of tables 3.8 and 3.9 shows the inferiority 
of the dollar standard in the face of the inflation shock, but the expla- 
nation is not convincing. McKibbin and Sachs argue that the United 
States attempts to import  disinflation in this case by  engineering a 
disinflation abroad using tight money  and fiscal ease in  the United 
States. But under the dollar standard in table 3.9, Japanese real GNP 
and inflation are higher than with the floating rate, and GNP and infla- 
tion in the ROECD are about the same. The modified McKinnon rule 
removes the incentive for competitive appreciation, so the results re- 
semble the cooperative flexible regime. As the welfare scores in section 
3.5 show, there is not much difference among the two floating rate 
cases and the McKinnon rule in the disinflation game. 
One of the main lessons from recent work on coordination is that 
the ranking of regimes depends on the source of disturbances. So in 
section 3.6 McKibbin and Sachs report the asymptotic variance of MSG 
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mand, the price level, and the velocity of money, in alternatively the 
United  States and the  ROECD. In table 3.11  we  see that the non- 
cooperative float seems best for demand shocks, and in table 3.12 the 
cooperative  and  noncooperative floats share first place  under price 
shocks. With money velocity shocks in one country, the McKinnon 
rule stabilizes the economy where the shock originates, by  inducing 
an offsetting money supply response, but destabilizes the other econ- 
omy. This is shown in table 3.13. But with negative correlation across 
countries in velocity shocks in table 3.14, the McKinnon rule domi- 
nates. This is as it should be, since the rule was designed for a world 
in which shifts of asset preference across currencies are the dominant 
source of disturbances. 
What does the reader learn in this encounter with the McKibbin- 
Sachs global model? First, we see that with a heavy dose of MSG we 
can obtain sensible-looking numerical results that conform to intuition 
based on simple analytical models. This should increase confidence in 
the model’s usefulness  in  analyzing policy alternatives.  Second, we 
see that no regime dominates. The results depend on sources of shocks 
and probably also on the nature  of  the game that policymakers are 
playing. This makes it difficult to see how a coordination agreement 
could be negotiated internationally at the present time. Third, the non- 
cooperative float looks like a fairly good regime. It would work es- 
pecially well if  central banks could agree to rule out competitive ap- 
preciation in the face of inflation shocks. 
Research on monetary or macro policy coordination seems to be 
following three different paths. One is simulation study, taking empir- 
ical parameters and the institutional framework that would induce pol- 
icymakers to join the  specified cooperative game or set of  rules  as 
given. The present paper is on this path. A second is actual empirical 
work, attempting to estimate better models for the simulation studies 
to manipulate. The third path is the design of institutions that provide 
the incentives for policymakers to coordinate in productive ways. Per- 
haps further work with MSG or its descendants can contribute to this 
third line of  research by developing regimes that offer policymakers 
such incentives. 
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Comment  Robert P.  Flood 
In this paper McKibbin and Sachs present  some policy  simulations 
using their global model. The model is listed in the paper’s appendix, 
and its construction has been discussed elsewhere. Since the model is 
not treated specifically here, I will make no specific comments on it. 
I will, however, make three kinds of general comments about the paper. 
First, I will list and explain briefly some standard caveats concerning 
this type of simulation exercise. Second, I will discuss what I think 
are some problems associated with the arbitrary loss function adopted 
by  the authors. Third, I will discuss a methodological problem with 
using this type of model for policy evaluation. My comments are all 
critical, but that should not be taken as a negative evaluation of the 
work. This paper is state-of-the-art, open-economy policy evaluation 
and is a quantum leap beyond many of its competitors. I know of  no 
work on this topic that is not subject to similar negative comments. In 
my  view though, the paper illustrates that economists are a long way 
from being able to give policy advice based on recent ideas. (Such a 
gap may well be a health steady state.) 
Everything I have to say is at some level a variant of the famous 
Lucas Econometric Policy Evaluation Critique. I think this is to be 
expected. McKibbin and Sachs have undertaken policy evaluation us- 
ing a data-based model, and this was precisely the setting for Lucas’s 
critique. Most of the points Lucas made concerning modeling the first 
moments of  agents’ beliefs about a model’s variables have been an- 
swered in the present simulation strategy, so I will take up a few other 
aspects of the critique. 
Some Standard Caveats 
Recall that the Lucas Critique is a criticism of the methodology of 
estimating parameters using data generated under one regime and tak- 
ing these parameters as being necessarily invariant to policy-regime 
changes. Lucas’s suggested research program to carry out econometric 
policy evaluation requires that deep structural parameters of tastes and 
technology  be  estimated.  The hope is that  such parameters  will  be 
invariant to policy-regime changes. 
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McKibbin and Sachs have treated parameters  such as adjustment 
speeds in money markets as policy-invariant.  I would expect adjust- 
ment  speeds to be chosen by agents as an optimal response to the 
economic environment.  Parameters  such as these may  well change 
radically in response to the various monetary policies simulated in the 
paper. Therefore, I would have found helpful a report on the sensitivity 
of the simulations to policy-induced alterations in some of the param- 
eters. An alternative might have been to design the simulated policies 
so that it can be argued that a policy shift would have little effect on 
the parameters. 
In the appendix the parameterization of the model is given with the 
parameters treated as fixed numbers. Almost all of these numbers are 
actually random variables, some probably quite imprecisely estimated, 
some jointly distributed with other parameters, and some (almost surely) 
inconsistently estimated according to the model being simulated. I do 
not think anything can be done easily about these points. Some notion 
of the confidence intervals of the simulations would have been useful 
to me with those confidence intervals based on the joint distribution 
of the parameters.  I also would have liked a section persuading me 
that a reasonable attempt had been made to secure parameter estimates 
consistent under the simulated model. 
Social Welfare 
The social welfare function adopted for the dynamic game simulation 
in section 3.5 is not necessarily consistent with the behavior in the rest 
on the model. Ideally, the social welfare function would be a policy 
invariant function of the utilities of the agents responsible for behavior 
in the rest of the model. 
The specific social welfare function adopted in the paper makes the 
flow  of  social welfare  a quadratic function of  the output gap, CPI 
inflation, the current account as a percentage of GDP, and the budget 
deficit relative to GDP.  The quadratic form  implies that optimizing 
government policy minimizes a linear function of the second moments 
of these variables. Some assumption about the social welfare function 
must be made, but why is this a particularly interesting assumption? 
Some of the variables listed in the chosen function-for  example, the 
current account and the government deficit relative to GDP-are  mea- 
sures of variables that adjust to buffer shocks and would not in general 
be zero at stochastic “bliss.” 
My guess is that McKibbin and Sachs adopted their social welfare 
function on the basis of their observations of statements made by rep- 
resentatives of OECD governments. My fear is that such statements 
are regime-specific and would be altered under precisely the conditions 
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correct, then even the social welfare function (since it is not derived 
from deeper considerations) should not be viewed as policy-invariant. 
What Do We  Mean by Changes in Policy? 
The methodology of rational expectations requires that agents have 
rational beliefs about the moments of variables relevant to their deci- 
sions. This presents  a new problem  for those trying to give policy 
advice.  Under some other assumptions it is sensible to think  about 
introducing a new policy or reviving some long-dormant policy with 
agents reacting to the policy shift as if it were a complete surprise and 
as if  they thought the policy would never be abandoned. Rational ex- 
pectations are somewhat more demanding of the would-be policy adviser. 
Fully rational agents are rational about policy. They understand that 
government policy is altered from time to time as dictated by events. 
The realization of a particular policy is like the realization of any other 
random variable.  When it happens it is a surprise, but  it is not  an 
entirely unforeseen surprise. Furthermore, when the policy is realized 
there is typically no reason for agents to believe that the current policy 
realization is the final policy realization. 
Rational expectations, consequently, lead us to think about policy 
modeling in a very different way than we thought about it ten or fifteen 
years ago. Policy is the outcome of a (possibly optimizing) decision 
process, and policy is set and changed as the state variables relevant 
to the policy decision  process evolve. Consequently, to give policy 
advice in a rational expectations environment, one must first discover 
what historical  state of the system led to the choice of  the current 
policy and then find out how the state has evolved since the most recent 
policy choice was made. 
McKibbin and  Sachs approach  policy  modeling in  the traditional 
way-an  econometric model is used  to simulate the effects of  new 
policies taking as fixed the nonpolicy economic environment in which 
the model was estimated. It seems to me that this approach is internally 
inconsistent. Why is new policy advice needed unless the economic 
environment has somehow changed? But if the economic environment 
has changed, the change should have been incorporated into the eco- 
nomic model. 
Final Comments 
As I mentioned at the beginning of my comments, the McKibbin and 
Sachs paper is state-of-the-art policy modeling. Although my comments 
were all negative, I do not want to give the impression that I know of 
any work on this topic that is not subject to similar negative comments. 